Abstract: Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions. 
INTRODUCTION
A broad set of experimental results indicates that people frequently choose actions that do not maximize their monetary payoffs. People reject positive offers in the ultimatum game, make positive allocations to anonymous parties in the dictator game, and make voluntary public contributions that reduce their own material reward. 1 There is field evidence as well, as seen in anonymous charitable contributions. It is now generally accepted that many people have social or psychological considerations which can lead them to sacrifice monetary payoffs in the course of maximizing their utility. This can have substantial economic consequences even for those who do, in fact, maximize only their own expected monetary payoff.
What are the underlying motivations in these cases? In the past few years there have been a number of theories attempting to explain this behavior. One explanation is simple altruism, where people care not only about their own material well-being but also about the material well-being of others. However, theories of altruism may be overly simplistic, as an agent is assumed to assign a constant weight to the welfare of every other individual.
Another approach expands the altruism principle by incorporating distributive concerns.
Under such models, also known as equity (or fairness) models, one's regard for another person's monetary well-being depends on the other person's monetary payoff relative to one's own. Current models in this category are Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) [henceforth, BO] , and Fehr and Schmidt (1997) [henceforth, FS] . Finally, "reciprocity" theories expand the principle of altruism in a different direction, asserting that regard for someone else's payoff depends on how 'kind' the other is perceived to be. The principle of reciprocal altruism emphasizes the relationship between one's action and one's beliefs about the intentions of the other agent(s). The leading model in this category is Rabin (1993) , while Levine (1996) offers an alternative formulation.
The issue of which approach, if any, best explains experimental data remains open.
Each have been shown to effectively explain outcomes in only some proper subset of the various experimental settings. However, as stated by BO (pg. 1), "if no connections can be found, we are left with a set of disjoint behavioral charts, each valid on a limited domain."
Some have argued that one must combine the insights of altruism, distributive concerns, and reciprocity to obtain a sufficiently descriptive model. In this paper, we estimate representative models from these general approaches and suggest a simple encompassing approach to estimation which nests altruism, distributive concerns, and reciprocity. Our encompassing approach allows for nested comparisons and testing of leading models and offers a flexible alternative that can potentially overcome some of their limitations.
THE LITERATURE
In the ultimatum game, one person in a mutually anonymous pair proposes a division of a sum of money to the other person, who chooses to either accept the proposal or reject it. A rejection means both people receive no money. As rejections are not uncommon (particularly with rather uneven proposals), it seems that people are sometimes willing to deliberately sacrifice money. Using a sequential version of the ultimatum game, Ochs and Roth (1989) demonstrated that many players would reject a proposed positive sum of money and subsequently make counter-proposals which, if accepted, would give them less money than would the original proposal, but would still give them more money than the other player. 2 These disadvantageous counter-offers were explained by Bolton (1991) . The main feature of this model is that an individual's utility is composed of both her material payoffs and some disutility when her monetary reward is smaller than that of the other player.
However, people don't mind at all if the disparity in material payoffs is in their favor. While this model explains ultimatum game behavior, it does not address results such as positive dictator game allocations and the costly effort provision found in gift-exchange experiments, (e.g., Fehr et al, 1993) . Rabin (1993) suggests that intentional reciprocity, both positive and negative, can play a role. However, his conventional model does not explain the 'reciprocity-free' component of distributive concerns, which seems to be present in many experimental results. Levine (1996) combines both general altruistic or spiteful tendencies with a personal component which accommodates a form of reciprocity. However, this model does not permit any influence for comparative payoffs and the range of the non-pecuniary term is rather limited.
BO address the asymmetry of the Bolton (1991) model by asserting that people suffer disutility whenever payoffs are unequal; it is assumed that this disutility is symmetric with respect to which player receives the greater material payoff. However, reciprocity and intention are excluded from this theory, as the authors argue that there is little laboratory evidence that these have significant influence. FS allow for an asymmetric effect of relative payoffs with a self-centered inequality aversion. Both models have a moderate degree of 2 There was a substantial discount factor between periods. success in explaining behavior in bilateral bargaining, public goods environments, and markets.
However, neither the BO model nor the FS model can explain results such as Blount (1995) and Charness (1996) . Blount elicits 'minimum acceptable offers' in a strategymethod version of the ultimatum game. A comparison between treatments where this offer is said to be generated by either a random mechanism or a self-interested party shows a clear difference (the minimum acceptable offer averages 12% of the pie in the former case, but 29% in the latter). Charness isolates the specific role of intention in the "gift-exchange" setting by comparing the effort/wage gradient when wages are determined by the employer or by a random mechanism, finding that this component is significant, although smaller than the component for distributive concerns. On the other hand, studies such as Bolton, Brandts, and Katok (1997) and Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (1997) find no statistically significant effect for intention, although the latter study states (pg. 12) that "the difference in average contributions is equal to 12%."
The psychology literature provides support for including reciprocity in a model of economic behavior. Heider (1958) introduced the idea that causal inference, where one takes into account another person's motives and situational constraints, is an important cognitive process for perceiving social contexts. Individuals have a need to infer causes and to attempt to assign responsibility for outcomes. When volition is absent, feelings of revenge and gratitude dissipate or vanish.
3 Experimental studies include Greenberg and Frisch (1972) , who find that help which is deliberately given leads to more reciprocity than does accidental help, and Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) , who confirm a differential sequential response conditioned on prior help provided by another agent. 
THE EXPERIMENT
We examine data from Charness (1996) . A total of 122 subjects participated in this experiment; 61 each in the 'employee' and 'employee' roles. Average earnings (including a $5 show-up fee) were between $16 and $17 in a session of less than 2 hours. All subjects were students at the University of California at Berkeley. The design was quite similar to the BGE/TC treatment in Fehr et al (1998; preliminary version in 1994) ; the only change was that employees could not reject the wage. 5 There were, in general, ten employers and ten employees in each session, where a session consisted of ten periods. Employers and employees initially all met in one large room. Pairings were anonymous and it was common knowledge that employees and employers were not re-matched.
6
An employee was given a wage, which had been assigned by either an employer or an external process. The process by which the wage was determined was fully known to the employee. No employee was in more than one of the treatments, since each session was a different treatment. Once assigned a wage, each employee was asked to record her effort choice (between 0.1 and 1.0, inclusive) on a record sheet. The monitor then gave this sheet intention, of the benefactor. Attribution to source and intention has similar significance in the case of revenge." (Heider, 1958, p. 265) 4 See also Thibaut and Riecken (1955) , Kelley and Stahelski (1970) , Kahn and Tice (1973) , and Thomas and Batson (1981) . 5 The complete instructions can be obtained by contacting the first author or can be downloaded from: http://www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/onepaper?283. 6 In some cases, there were less than 20 subjects in a session, so that there was inevitably some re-matching. However, these were still anonymous and subjects were assured that no pairing would be repeated in two consecutive periods. A careful analysis of the data (see Charness, 1996) shows that there were no apparent reputation effects.
to the corresponding employer in the other room, so that the employer had physical evidence of the employee's choice. This procedure was common knowledge.
The combination of wage and effort determined outcomes and monetary payoffs for each pair of subjects in a period. Each employer was given an endowment of 120 "income coupons" in each period. The monetary payoff functions were given by:
and
where ∏ F denotes the payoff to the 'employer' (firm), ∏ E denotes the payoff to the 'employee,' e denotes the employee's effort, w is the wage, and c(e) is the cost of effort, a non-linear function increasing in e. The exact cost function facing an employee is as follows: The innovation in this experiment was that the source of the wage differed across sessions and was known to be generated by either a self-interested employer, a draw from a bingo cage, or the experimenter (in advance). Only one wage-determination mechanism was used in each session.
Note that the unique Nash equilibrium (which can be easily deduced by backwards induction) of w = 20 and e = 0.1 is socially inferior as there are many outcomes which would make both players better off. Indeed, employees and employers consistently deviate from their Nash equilibrium choices, with employers providing on average wages in excess of 50 and employees providing an average effort levels greater than 0.3.
THE THEORY
This section is divided into four sub-sections. Each of the first three sections presents a simple representative model corresponding to a general approach. The last section presents an approach which nests these approaches, thereby providing a useful tool for comparison of behavioral motives.
It is common in experimental design of this nature to estimate only the second mover's utility function. Since estimating a utility function for the first mover, the employer, involves specifying expectations on the second mover's actions, it is easier (if we are willing to relax the assumption of equilibrium beliefs) to estimate only the employee's utility function based on her choices, taking the employer's action and her perception of the employer's intentions as given. Hence, all utility functions in the sections that follow will be defined for the employee only.
Altruism
The basic altruism model in this setting would postulate a utility function for the employee of the form:
where α, the altruism parameter, is constant over the payoff space in this formulation.
"Altruists" are considered to have α > 0, while α equals 0 for pure money-maximizers. It is also generally accepted that α < 1. In other words, another person's monetary payoff is not as rewarding as one's own. While each individual has a distinct value for α, this value is independent of previous actions or history for other agents.
Fairness and distributive justice

The egalitarian notion of fairness
The egalitarian notion of fairness implies that a fair distribution assigns everyone an equal share of resources. Two simple models corresponding to this notion are BO and FS.
Although there are some qualitative differences between the BO and FS models, they generally make similar behavioral predictions, particularly in the case of two agents. We use the FS model for purposes of comparison. Applying the two-agent version of this model to the gift-exchange setting, we have:
where it is assumed that β ≤ α and 0 ≤ β < 1. This means that, in addition to being concerned with one's own pecuniary reward, one also cares about equity. Furthermore, assuming β > 0, one's disutility is increasing in the distance between payoffs. This parsimonious model captures the concept that one cares about one's payoff not only in absolute terms but also in comparison to others. However, a potential drawback (due to the non-negativity restriction on the model's parameters) is that this model does not nest simple altruism, where one receives some positive utility from the level of another agent's material payoff, independently of one's own.
Another drawback is that often α and β cannot both be estimated. Note that in ultimatum games only α can be estimated. 7 In the gift-exchange context, only β can be estimated, as the only way for an employee to sacrifice monetary payoffs when assigned an unfavorable wage is to increase her effort, thereby rewarding the employer for his unkind behavior! A third concern involves the linearity of one's utility in the payoff difference. It may not be reasonable to expect a sharp discontinuity, at the reference point, in the weight one assigns to the other's payoff. Furthermore, it may be unreasonable to expect one's weight in a close neighborhood of the reference point to be the same as when the outcome reflects substantial inequity. A quadratic function in the payoff difference might seem more plausible. However, the first order condition with such a representation makes the problem rather intractable. Moreover, coefficients lose the interpretation of weight on inequality.
Other notions of fairness
Two common alternative concepts of distributive justice are the utilitarian and Rawlsian social welfare functions. The utilitarian view asserts that people should maximize some function which is monotonically increasing in the well-being of each member of society. The simplest utilitarian model maximizes the sum of payoffs (eq (3) with α = 1).
On the other hand, the Rawlsian approach involves maximizing the payoff of the worst-off agent.
Two other results shed some light on these differing notions of equity. 8 A third player (henceforth, player C) was to choose an outcome for two anonymous players. 9 In one treatment, C was asked to choose between (1200,0) and (400,400) for players (A,B);
here 18/22 (82%) subjects picked (400,400). Yet, in the second treatment, when C chose between (750,375) and (400,400), only 11/24 (46%) selected (400,400). The difference is significant (χ 2 test) at a p-value of .01. In the first case, the egalitarian and Rawlsian notions win over the simple utilitarian model; however, this is reversed in the second case.
Thus, it appears that equity is not limited to considerations of equality. Although agents' relative shares may be important, so is the total amount to be distributed. This suggests that inequality aversion is not the only proxy for fairness. As we find in section 6, the FS model does not fare well with the gift-exchange results. Yet distributive concerns are the only plausible explanation for non-minimal effort provision in the non-volitional treatments, since the employer's lack of choice means no motives of kindness or unkindness can be attributed. 
Intentional reciprocity
A critical question concerns the effects of the perceived intentions of others on behavior. While evidence from laboratory experiments is mixed, one should bear in mind that these settings have anonymous players and relatively little visceral impact; hence one cannot readily induce the full spectrum of emotional interaction in a laboratory environment.
The final paragraph of FS states: "The idea that an action is judged not only in terms of its consequences, but also in terms of its intentions, certainly has some appeal."
Suppose an agent cares about money and comparative payoffs, but also has feelings (regard) about another agent's absolute payoffs. If this regard for another person depends on one's perceptions of that person's prior actions, we would require a model of reciprocity, or reciprocal altruism, as exemplified by Rabin (1993) and Levine (1996) . The key to these models is that one's utility is affected by one's perception of another agent's "type." A potential drawback is that reciprocity models do not generally nest or explicitly incorporate concerns for relative payoffs or altruistic behavior.
We present the framework of Rabin (1993) . The employee's kindness to the employer as a function of effort is given by To gauge the employer's kindness (as perceived by the employee, a critical issue here), we would need to know the employee's belief about the employer's belief about the relationship of effort to the wage assigned. For example, if the employee believed that the employer expected the same effort regardless of the wage, any wage above 20 would be considered "kind." However, if the employee believes that the employer is merely offering a higher wage in an attempt to maximize her own expected earnings, one might consider a kind wage to be one that exceeds the profit-maximizing level.
As we are unable to observe an employee's beliefs, we shall assume that he knows that the employer knows that this profit-maximizing wage is 70, which is ex post seen to have actually yielded the employer the highest expected profits, as is shown in the figure below:
Insert figure 1 here
Incidentally, a wage of 70 is the reference point (the wage that would yield the middle point in the opponent's payoff given the opponent's action) suggested by Rabin (1993) . Hence, the employer's kindness is now gauged by
where w e = 70. Thus, the values of f F and f E must lie in the interval [-1/2, 1/2]. These kindness functions can now be used to specify the employee's preferences:
The central behavioral feature of this utility specification reflects the main principle in models of reciprocity: If the employee believes that the employer is treating him poorly (f F < 0) then he will reciprocate with a negative value for f E and would attempt to reduce the employer's payoff. On the other hand, if the employee believes that the employer is treating him favorably (f F > 0), then he prefers f E > 0 and will sacrifice money to benefit the employer, leading to a non-minimal choice of effort.
A variation on this functional form, also given by Rabin (1993) , nests altruism as a special case. This formulation (henceforth Rabin II) is:
In this utility function, when α > 0 the employee will wish to be kind to the employer, even when the latter is "neutral" to the employee. If α is close to 1, then pure altruism dominates behavior. Because the kindness functions are bounded above and below, the behavior in this model is sensitive to the scale of material payoffs.
Rabin's model is qualitative in nature and does not provide the relative power of non-pecuniary versus material interests. However, Rabin acknowledges that the nonpecuniary term in the utility function must be re-scaled to correspond to the payoff scale.
Here the scaling factor should be proportional to the range of payoffs for the employer, so the applicable factor is the payoff range for the employer, which is 0.9×(120 -w). Besides re-scaling the non-pecuniary term to the employer's payoff scale, this scaling factor has the desirable feature that when the employer is neutral, the model reverts to the simple altruism model of Eq (3) and α is the same as the altruism parameter therein. Given the specification of f E and f F and the re-scaling by 0.9×(120 -w), we get
An encompassing approach
While all of these models have a considerable degree of success in explaining deviations from monetary payoff maximization, each fails to plausibly account for a nontrivial proportion of observed behavior. One relatively parsimonious combination of these models is:
where R(w) represents the regard of the employee for the employer as a function of the employer's action.
Definition:
Regard is the weight in one's utility function relative to one's monetary payoff on the monetary payoff of the other's. Regard is defined as a function of the state of the world (initial endowments) and the other's (observed or expected) action. Therefore, we can use simple likelihood-ratio hypothesis testing to compute a significance level for each approach and compare the approaches' relative strengths. In addition, our approach by itself provides a flexible alternative to assess a functional form in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. For example, when there is no intention (as is the case the non-volition treatments), the encompassing model is better suited to examine distributive concerns since the linearity restriction on the payoff difference is eliminated. Theoretical justification aside, R(w) can be thought of as a flexible fourth-degree polynomial approximation of an unknown function in the wage.
An important difference from the conventional Rabin model is that R(w) is not necessarily 0 in the default case, when the employer has had no choice to make.
PRELIMINARY TESTS AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
We begin by examining whether we can pool observations over time-periods. While, in principle, the matching protocol prevents reputation effects from forming, players may be nevertheless modifying their behavior over time. Looking at the average effort, wage, and effort/wage ratio for each period (Appendix B), there are no apparent changes in behavior.
Simple joint hypothesis F-tests (Appendix B) confirm this assertion. This is consistent with similar findings by Fehr and co-authors in gift-exchange experiments.
Next we examine whether the two non-volition treatments (bingo cage draws and experimenter-determined wage) can be pooled with each other and/or whether they can be pooled with the volition (employer-determined wages) case. If we were to find no significant difference between behavior in volition and non-volition sessions, we would be able to eliminate intentional reciprocity as a factor. . This functional form was estimated for each of the treatments using the Tobit procedure (effort is left-censored at 0.1, with numerous observations of e = 0.1). Next, the two non-volition treatments were pooled and the parameter estimates from the pooled regression were imposed on each of the three sessions. Hence, we cannot reject pooling the two non-volition treatments at any reasonable level of significance, but we can easily reject pooling across volition conditions at all reasonable levels of significance. Proceeding in this manner, we obtain Figure 2:
The statistic for the likelihood ratio test is
χ 2 = -2 (log L r -log L u ),
Insert Figure 2 here
Comparing across treatment groups, the effort levels look roughly the same in the center of the wage range. However, we see significant differences at the extremes of the wage range. This would seem to offer an opportunity to separate equity and reciprocity considerations. The area in between the curves reflects intentional reciprocity since intention is the only difference between the two treatments. Yet, one cannot readily draw conclusions since no structural form for utility has been specified. Hence, we cannot separate non-pecuniary concerns from pecuniary ones, much less equity from reciprocity.
One must estimate a functional form for utility.
Still, there are a few observations worth noting in figure 2: (1) Effort is rising at an increasing rate as wage approaches 120. This is counterintuitive since effort is costly at high effort levels whereas the benefit to the employer from higher levels of effort is tiny or nonexistent as wage approaches 120. We may attribute this to increasing importance on the opponent's pay due to non-linear distributive concerns. Alternatively, this phenomenon can be explained by an equity notion defined by effort rather than by pay levels. (2) At low wages (less than 35), effort predictions are below 0.1. Since we do not have observations on effort levels below 0.1, these predictions arise from the Probit portion of the Tobit procedure.
Let ν denote the vector of parameter to be estimated for a given model. Then for a
given model the functional of utility can be represented by U E (w, e; ν). The first step is to differentiate U E (w, e; ν) with respect to e. To do so we must first define a smooth approximation for c(e). The quadratic form is:
c(e) = 9.9 (e -0.1) + 11.1 (e -0.1)
(11)
The first order condition for maximization would be
Solving (12) for e, we get the optimal effort e as a function of w and ν: e = g(w ; ν).
We now define the likelihood function to be maximized with respect to ν as
where D it (i indexes individuals and t indexes time) is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if effort exceeds 0.1 and 0 otherwise.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Detailed estimation results are given in Tables III-XIII . Below we present a summary for each model discussed above. The parameter σ is obtained for each model and denotes the standard deviation. We report the standard deviation as a measure of goodness of fit. We also compare the log-likelihood over models. Note that all models are nested within the encompassing (flexible polynomial) approach. Given the above values for σ and the log-likelihood for each model, one can make some nested comparisons. We observe that:
(1) Pure pecuniary considerations can be rejected in favor of pure altruism, or for that matter, in favor of any one of the models estimated.
(2) Though altruism is successful relative to a model of pure monetary considerations, it can be rejected in favor of (an unrestricted 14 two-parameter) FS formulation.
(3) The two-parameter formulation of FS does not significantly outperform the oneparameter version here. This is expected given the inability by players to sacrifice payoff for equality when they are already monetarily disadvantaged relative to others.
(4) Altruism can also be rejected in favor of the Rabin II version, showing promise for
Rabin's reciprocity definition as an explanation. As we will shortly demonstrate, this success may be attributed to other factors. Nonetheless, altruism alone cannot account for the observed behavior.
(5) The Rabin I model of reciprocity can easily be rejected in favor of the Rabin II formulation, demonstrating the relative importance of altruism in the determination of non-pecuniary behavior.
(6) All four models of non-pecuniary motives can be rejected in favor of the flexible polynomial approach. This implies that Rabin I, Rabin II, and FS are over-restrictive.
However, a simple likelihood comparison reveals that Rabin II is substantially less so.
While restrictive forms result in a lower fit, they are often desirable due to theoretical appeal. If we insist on a restrictive form, Rabin II easily does best in the volition case.
However, one should be cautious in interpreting this superiority (in log likelihood terms) as supporting the notions of reciprocity and altruism, as opposed to equity considerations. The extent to which the reciprocity term in Rabin's model captures equity consideration can be assessed by estimating the same functional form of Rabin II for both volition and nonvolition.
If we desire a more flexible approach, the polynomial is not merely significantly better in likelihood; it allows a comprehensive approach which nests all of the restricted models, allows the relaxation of restrictions, and can potentially allow separating different motives. Parameters estimated under the flexible approach show that the equality dummy (D) is not significantly different than zero, dealing a further setback to the notion of equality as a social reference point for equity.
14 By unrestricted, we mean that we relax the FS restrictions that β ≤ α and 0 ≤ β < 1 in eq(4). From the estimates under the non-volition treatments, we observe that:
(1) The (two-parameter unrestricted) Fehr-Schmidt model of equity does not explain the data significantly better than altruism, by simple likelihood ratio statistic for nested comparisons.
(2) All models can be rejected by nested comparison in favor of the flexible approach.
(3) In likelihood terms alone, the Rabin II (volitional) formulation best fits the non-volitional treatments.
Given result (3) it would appear that the Rabin II form picks up some elements of distributive concerns as opposed to reciprocity. Our rejection of pure equality considerations (FS) is perhaps best explained by recalling our assertion (section 4.2.1) that equity is not the same as equality. It appears that the Rabin II formulation must be capturing an equity notion that is not captured by FS.
Consider the following idea:
In this approach (henceforth the equity formulation) α is the simple altruism parameter. The parameter β is the weight on equity, where equity is measured as the distance of effort from the minimum, and least equitable, level of effort. 16 
Robustness of parameter estimates
To test the predictive power of the flexible model out-of-sample, we estimate the model's parameters on a subset of games and use these estimates to predict the behavior in another subset of games. For this purpose, the composition of the two subsets must be similar and the subset used to estimate the parameters for prediction must be large enough to have a reasonable efficiency of parameter estimates. For the predicted subset (subset II), we chose the last five players from the bingo-cage treatment (by player index) and the first five players (by player index) from the treatment where wages were experimenterdetermined. We refer to the remaining subset of 29 players in the non-volition treatments as subset I.
Likelihood ratio tests, on subsets I and II, are used to test for robustness. We estimate parameters for one subset of games by maximum likelihood. We then impose these parameter estimates on a different subset and obtain the likelihood of the latter subset, called the predicted subset, with the imposed parameters.
We find that the likelihood-ratio statistic of subset I relative to the full set of players is 3.278, and the likelihood-ratio of subset II relative to the full set is 4.776; the respective p-values are 0.773 and 0.573; the 5% critical value is 12.59 (χ 2 distribution, 6 degrees of freedom). Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates from the full set of games are valid for subsets I and II. Further, the likelihood-ratio statistic for predicting subset II from subset I is 9.849, with a p-value of 0.131. 18 Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates from subset I are valid for subset II. In other words, the parameter estimates are stable across these subsets of games, demonstrating the out-of-sample predictive power of the model.
Discussion
We wished to assess the relative success of various models of non-pecuniary motives in explaining this experimental data. First, it should be noted that each of the three approaches (altruism, distributive concerns, and intentional reciprocity) have substantial success in explaining the observed deviations relative to the null hypothesis of pecuniary considerations alone. Which is best? Can we gain much from combining their insights?
The so-called equal division social reference point of FS and BO seems to outperform a pure altruism explanation when employers determine wage. However, this reference point is inferior to pure altruism when wages are determined exogenously. This would seem to indicate that whatever equity considerations exist, they either (1) have a social reference point different than equal division, 19 or (2) a disutility from inequitable outcomes that is non-linear in distance from the reference point, or both. Overall, it seems that despite the important insight they provide, neither the simple altruism nor the pure equity-based models can explain behavior in the two experiments analyzed in this paper.
The Rabin I model of reciprocity, which does not explicitly address distributive concerns, is also unsuccessful. On the other hand, the Rabin II formulation, which combines notions of reciprocity and altruism, does fairly well. However, estimation on the nonvolitional treatments suggests some weaknesses in this approach. In particular, the success of the reciprocity term in that model seems to be due to capturing distributive concerns in the data rather than intentional reciprocity.
We also find that the restrictive equity formulation is rather successful among restrictive models, thereby reinforcing the assertion made in the last paragraph as well as suggesting that kindness may be measured in terms of actions rather than in terms of payoffs.
We find that among all models the unrestricted encompassing model performs best.
Given the non-restrictive nature of the flexible approach, we can compare regard between the volition and non-volition treatments. The difference in regard can only be attributed to the difference in treatments; i.e., intention. Figure 3 displays regard as a function of wage for each treatment. Figure 4 shows the difference in regard between treatments plotted on wage. Note that, in the center of the wage range, regard is roughly identical over treatments. The differences occur for "low" (roughly, wages less than 40) and "high"
(roughly, wages greater than 80) wages. Not surprisingly, regard is lower when the "low"
wage can be attributed to unkind, or selfish, intentions on the part of the employer. A surprising finding is that regard is lower in the volition treatment for "high" wages. One possible explanation is that when an outcome "unfair" to one party is willingly initiated by that party, the other party does not feel an obligation to reduce this inequality. On the other hand, if a provisional outcome is unfair to a party unable to participate to that point, this party may feel a need for redress.
CONCLUSION
As non-pecuniary motives are becoming recognized in mainstream economics and models of non-pecuniary behavior are proposed, it is useful to make comparisons of the effectiveness of such models in explaining observed behavior. We do so by nesting a number of models of pecuniary and non-pecuniary behavior within each other as well as within a flexible encompassing approach. Nested comparisons reveal that distributive concerns, altruism, and intentional reciprocity each contributed significantly to explaining non-pecuniary motives. Furthermore, comparing FS to a flexible approach and Rabin II in the non-volition treatments seems to suggest that distributive concerns are not likely to be linear in the payoff difference.
Another contribution of this essay is the flexible approach to estimation and testing.
While this approach cannot be generalized to all settings, it is nonetheless warranted where possible. Though parsimony is reduced by adding parameters, we believe it is valuable to combine the insights of the various approaches into a richer model. We do not offer a complete model or a theoretical justification for the form of our flexible regard function or for the equity formulation; yet it is clear that these do a better job of fitting the data.
The flexible formulation (in particular its nesting properties and good fit of the data) allows us to separate intentional reciprocity from distributive concerns, demonstrating the existence of reciprocal behavior at low and high wages. We find that while unkind behavior is reciprocated with unkind behavior, kind behavior by the employer that puts the employer at a disadvantage may result in less attention to equity by the employee, as the unequal outcome is not considered to be the responsibility of the employee.
We feel that any successful model must accommodate the concerns of altruism, distributive concerns, and intentional reciprocity and suggest that further research is needed to develop a more descriptive model. It is true that our conclusions must be limited, as we only analyze data from one experiment. However, while we offer no formal analysis, evidence from some recent experiments also supports the view that intentional reciprocity plays an important role in non-pecuniary motives. Abbink et al (1997) and Offerman (1998) show strong effects for reciprocity and the latter paper also indicates that the causal attribution for an outcome significantly affects the sequential choice made. These results point to the need for alternative explanations of observed non-pecuniary behavior.
It may be presumptuous to even suggest that one can identify all the important influences on choices made in economic contexts. Yet we hope that analyses such as the one in this essay can lead to descriptive models which both capture important motives and preserve substantial parsimony. δ is restricted to the positive range, in accordance with the Fehr-Schmidt model. 22 Restricted to the positive real numbers, in accordance with FS. Not found to significantly differ from 0. 23 The α parameter is restricted to be positive. The t-statistic shows that α is not significant. Hereafter, only the one-parameter formulation will be presented under Fehr-Schmidt. However, the test for significance was conducted for each treatment and α is never significant. A casual look at the average wages and effort levels does not seem to support learning taking place in any period. The average-wage line seems relatively flat and the average effort level does not seem do display a pattern over time.
VII. Rabin I
Visual evidence must be supplemented by rigorous testing. Let t q be the average effort at time t.
The F-test is a joint test of the hypotheses: Ho: We briefly describe the F-test: The F-test compares the unrestricted regression, q it = µ + α i d i + β t D t + ε, to the restricted regression, q it = µ + α i d i + ε, where d i is an individual dummy, D t is a time dummy, and α i , β t , and µ are parameters to be estimated. We impose two identification restrictions: Σ t α i = 0 and Σ i β t = 0.
It is easily verifiable, given the restrictions, that the estimate for µ will be the mean effort.
For each run, we first calculate the mean effort for the entire population over all time periods, q , the mean effort for each individual i over all time periods, ⋅ i q , and the mean effort in each time period t over all individuals, t q ⋅ . The estimated individual effect (subject to the identification restrictions) for individual i is i á = ⋅ i q -q . The estimated time effect in period t (subject to the identification restrictions) is t â = t q ⋅ -q . The F-test is as follows:
(1) We compute the unrestricted residuals by subtracting from each observation on effort, q it , the average effort, q , the estimated individual effect, i á , and the estimated time effect, β t .
(2) We compute the restricted residuals by subtracting from each observation on effort only the mean effort and estimated individual effect.
(3) The F-statistic is calculated as [(RSSR -USSR) / (T -1)] / [USSR / (N T -(N -1) -(T -1) -1)],
where RSSR is the restricted sum of squared residuals, USSR is the unrestricted sum of squared residuals, T is the number of time periods, and N is the number of individuals.
The F-statistics for the treatments of employer-determined wages, bingo-cage wages, and experimenterdetermined wages are 0.254, 0.777, and 0.300, respectively. Under the null hypothesis of no time effects, these statistics should be distributed F (9, 188), F (9, 161), and F (9, 170), respectively. The respective critical values at the 5% level of significance are 1.930, 1.938, and 1.935. Hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no time effects at the 5% significance level.
